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Abstract: Recently, standards and regulations concerning occupational safety have become more and
more rigorous. Nevertheless, the number of accidents and victims has not decreased significantly, as
reported by official statistics. In Italy, the agricultural sector is certainly one of the most affected by
this situation, especially taking into account the occurrence of serious injuries and fatalities related
to the use of tractors. The main reasons for such a situation can be ascribed to the peculiarities
of agricultural operations. Therefore, when analyzing the root causes of agricultural accidents, a
user-centered approach is needed in order to make the development of health and safety interventions
easier and more effective. Based on this, the present paper proposes a practical case study research
focused on integrating the factor of human error into the risk assessment procedures of agricultural
activities in vineyard cultivation. Such an approach allowed us to consider the impact of human
error—while performing work activities (e.g., the use of a tractor)—on hazards and related hazardous
events in a thorough manner. The proposed approach represents a novelty in the sector of the
safety assessment of agricultural activities, providing a first valuable basis for further analysis and
implementation by researchers and practitioners.
Keywords: health and safety; agricultural machinery; hazard analysis; Quality Function Deployment
(QFD); human error; ergonomics; human safety management
1. Introduction
The growing awareness of the importance of safety in the agricultural and forestry activities is
supported by a continuous improvement of standards and regulations concerning both occupational
and work equipment safety [1]. Nevertheless, the number of accidents and victims in this sector is
still significant, and agriculture is recognized as being among the most dangerous industries [2–4].
The main reasons for such a situation can be ascribed to the peculiarities of agricultural operations.
In fact, the different typologies of activities carried out by the same operators, the use of obsolete
machinery and equipment, the continuous change of workplaces, and the simultaneous use of the
working site by different operators, are all elements that can make the task of assessing and managing
risk excessively complex [5,6]. In addition, weather conditions and unpredictable work schedules
during seasonal production periods present further uncertainty in risk assessment model inputs [7].
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Accordingly, Kim et al. [8] underlined the complexity of finding the root causes of agricultural accidents,
and highlighted the need to implement a user-centered approach to making the development of health
and safety interventions more effective. In line with this, numerous studies have highlighted that most
accidents are due to unsafe work conditions and operators’ behavior [9–11].
Hence, a more detailed study of operators’ behavior while performing work activities needs to be
addressed in order to properly analyze risk factors, and consequently, adopt effective preventive and
protective measures [12–14]. In other words, a human-centered approach should be adopted to take
into account human behaviors performed in work situations [15], as well as all the activities related to
the use of a work equipment, considering foreseeable errors during its operation [16,17]. As a matter
of fact, of human error is one of the major causes of accidents [18,19]. With the words “human error”
we consider the error types classified by Reason [20]: slips and lapses (i.e., execution errors due to
attentional or memory failures, respectively); mistakes (i.e., diagnostic and decision-making failures);
and violations (i.e., intentional and unintentional deviations from accepted procedures, standards and
rules) [21–24].
In particular, while half the accidents in agriculture occur when operating machinery [25],
two-thirds of them are influenced by haste, fatigue, and stress [9]. Consequently, a proactive and
thorough approach aimed at effectively performing hazard identification and risk reduction should be
implemented [26,27].
To be more precise, risk assessment should consider the mutual influences that might arise among
the different risks and the related potential effects, since carrying out risk assessment in a sequential
manner (i.e., cause-effect analysis) is insufficient, given the complexity of these interactions [28].
Moreover, the lack of data on accidents in the agricultural field complicates the implementation of
commonly-used risk assessment methods [29]. On the other hand, a human-centered approach is
needed, since “safety is, above all, behavioral and individual”, to use the words of Llory [30]. In a
practical context, this is particularly important when analyzing the risks of working activities related
to the use of a machinery or work equipment [29–36].
To deal with these issues, several studies have recommended the use of the Quality Function
Deployment (QFD) method [37] as a means of performing hazard analysis and risk assessment
of working tasks in a holistic manner [18,38,39]. Its application in the agricultural field is also
reported [28,40], to some extent. Nevertheless, these studies do not provide a detailed analysis of the
human factors related to potential risks, providing little information on how human interaction with
agricultural working tasks might lead to incidents.
In order to address these issues, the present study aims at investigating operators’ behavior,
examining how a specific working activity is carried out, the task steps, the equipment used, and the
relationships between these factors, with the goal of integrating risk analysis with information useful
for error prediction strategies.
In more detail, the proposed approach integrates the QFD method with the following tools,
which were classified as error prediction techniques by Lyons [41]:
• The Hierarchical Task Analysis (HTA) [42];
• The Human Error Assessment and Reduction Technique (HEART) [43].
Such an approach has been verified through a case study concerning vineyard cultivation in
collaboration with a company operating in the central part of Italy.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: in the next section, background and
motivations are discussed. In Section 3, our research approach is described, while Section 4 illustrates
the case study. Section 5 discusses the achieved results, and Section 6 concludes the paper by addressing
further research work.
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2. Background and Motivations
As mentioned, the number of accidents in agriculture is consistently high at a global
level [8,13,44,45]. In the EU, agriculture is considered a high-risk industry; together with
manufacturing, construction, and transportation, it accounted for about 15% of all fatal accidents at
work, as reported by official statistics [46].
In Italy, the occurrence of fatalities in this sector is also significant [47]. Official statistics [48]
which consider regularly employed workers show that in recent years, in spite of a slight reduction,
more than 100 people lost their lives. In particular, Figure 1 shows the trend of the incidence rate
(i.e., the number of accidents in relation to the number of employed workers) in agriculture (broken
lines), compared with accidents in the industry and service sectors (solid lines) in the period from
2012–2016 [48,49]. The upper lines indicate the trend of total accidents, while the bottom lines denote
the trend of fatal accidents.
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Furthermore, the official statistics only consider accidents that occurred to regularly employed
workers; if we take into account temporary or part-time workers in addition to the regular ones,
self-employed workers and the so-called “hobbyists” (i.e., people running agricultural activities during
their spare time or after retirement), the rate of accidents is higher. For instance, considering the data
collected by the special Observatory issued by the National Institute for Insurance against Accidents at
Work (INAIL) to monitor such a phenomenon, it clearly emerges how dangerous agricultural activities
are, and how relevant the number of fatal accidents involving the use of tractors is (Table 1).
Table 1. Accidents related to the use of tractors [50,51].
Year Fatal Accidentsin Agriculture
Fatal Accident
Involving Tractors
Percentage of Fat l Accident
Involving Tractors
2013 199 21 60.8%
2014 189 121 64.0%
2015 205 137 66.8%
2016 197 114 69.5%
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A more detailed analysis focused on the latter aspect, brought to light that this type of accident,
is related to different activities, such as ripping, harvesting, pesticide application, or when the tractor
is used as a power unit [28]. The types of events that led to fatalities are summarized in Table 2 [50,51].
Table 2. Types of fatal accidents involving tractors.
Type 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Roll-over 116 80 85 89 100 106 90
Running-over 9 13 7 13 9 15 9
Falling 8 11 6 7 10 10 8
Collision 0 5 7 3 0 4 1
Others 2 18 8 9 2 2 6
Total 135 127 111 121 121 137 114
In light of this high rate of accidents, the agriculture sector is considered a high-risk
industry, e.g., similarly to the construction sector, which presents comparable characteristics [52,53].
Consequently, occupational safety laws and regulations are stricter than in other working contexts,
for example, as far as the rules related to mandatory training of workers and machinery operators are
concerned [54].
Nevertheless, while much research has investigated the adoption of a human-centered safety
management approaches in different sectors [30,55–58], few studies have analyzed the problems related
to the safe use of agricultural and forestry machinery considering the human behavior standpoint.
For instance, Cividino et al. [59] considering the type of accidents occurring in the Friuli Venezia
Giulia region (North-East of Italy), highlighted the fact that one of the main reasons for accidents
related to the use of tractors is the high percentage of non-compliance with laws and regulations
concerning safety issues, which users tend to consider as safe equipment. Görücü et al. [60] focused
on the drivers’ perception and accuracy in estimating the tilt angles when riding a tractor across
slopes, since side overturns are among the most common and dangerous types of tractor accidents.
Similarly, Caffaro et al. [61] investigated the risk perception of elder farmers, providing useful insights
for improving the safety level of this category of operators. Houshyar and Houshyar [62] highlighted
the lack of a proper perception of safety issues among tractor drivers in Iran. Other studies [63,64]
have investigated the role of proper pictograms on agricultural machinery: a consistent insight from
these research works highlights the fact that, by developing familiarity with the machine through
routine upkeep and inspection, the operator can increase his/her knowledge of the potential safety
hazards and related pictorials. A human-centered approach was applied by Cutini et al. [47] in order
to design an effective usage manual for agricultural machinery. They stressed the importance of user
support in selecting the topics to include in the manual, as well as in assessing its usability.
A more specific study by Irwin and Poots [65] investigated the non-technical-skills that farmers
might use to ensure effective and safe performance at work. In particular, the authors demonstrated
how psychosocial factors, such as stress, fatigue, time pressure, and poor awareness of situations, can
also have an impact on the safe use of machinery, as the latter was recognized as being among the
most hazardous activities by the interviewed people. Accordingly, in a further study [66], they argued
that, on the one hand, unsafe behaviors could be linked to poor situation awareness, as opposed
to intentional violations. On the other hand, operators that ignore their work environment are
more inclined to take shortcuts or violate the rules on a regular basis. Nevertheless, although the
above-mentioned studies provide remarkable research insights concerning operator risk perception
and safety attitudes, the occurrence of errors from a safety management point of view still appears
to be underestimated. In fact, to the authors’ knowledge, the practical inclusion of aspects related to
human error in risk assessment procedures for agricultural activities has only partially been taken
into account.
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Hence, the present paper aims at reducing such inadequacies, proposing a practical case study
research focused on the integration of human factor considerations within a risk assessment procedure
for agricultural activities. In other words, to deal with these issues, the following research question can
be raised: How should we consider, in an effective and thorough manner, the impact of human error
while performing working activities (e.g., the use of a tractor) on hazards and related hazardous events?
With the aim of providing an answer to this research question, the present study proposes a risk
assessment procedure based on the use of the QFD method to better address the mutual relationships
among working tasks, hazards, and possible risks, thus augmenting the benefits of our method by
means of the integration of human error prediction techniques, such as HTA and HEART.
3. Materials and Methods
In this section, a description of the methods and techniques used is provided, focusing on the
proposed risk assessment methodology.
3.1. Quality Function Deployment
The Quality Function Deployment (QFD) method [37] is a well-known tool [40,67,68], used in
design and management contexts to address the requirements of stakeholders (the “Voice of Customer”)
in terms of their technical characteristics. At the core of the method is the so-called “House of Quality”
(HoQ), whose innermost part is represented by the relationship matrix (Figure 2).
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Figure 2. Scheme of the traditional House of Quality (HoQ).
In more detail, HoQ links customer needs and expectations (the Customer Requirements (CRs))
to appropriate technical attributes (the Engineering Characteristics (ECs)) by means of a 1-3-9 score,
where 1 represents a low relationship, 3 a medium relationship, and 9 a strong relationship (while a
null value means no-relationship), as schematized in Figure 3. The final output is represented by the
weight of ECs, as well as their relative (normalized) weight; this consequently provides grounds for
their assessment and prioritization [69]. It is worth noting that in traditional HoQ, the importance
level of CRs is expressed by means of a score from 1 (low importance) to 5 (high importance).
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Based on this, different models of QFD have been proposed, starting from the simplest four-phase
model [70], where each step is characterized by a specific House of Quality (HoQ). Several studies
addressed the use of QFD in safety research [38,39,71]. In particular, the approach proposed by Bas [39]
consists of a three-phase method aimed at assessing the relationships among tasks and hazards,
hazards and events, and events compared with preventive and protective measures (Figure 4).
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This framewor presents a usefu procedure for risk assessment: in fact, starting from the working
tasks, it provides an analysis and evaluation of the impact that a certain hazard can have on different
types of events, as we l the effect that a preventive/protective measure can have on more than one
hazardous event.
3.2. Hierarc ical Task Analysis
The Hierarchical Task Analysis (HTA) technique [72] consists of breaking down working
tasks into more detailed subtasks and elementary tasks, structured in a hierarchical manner [41].
This “tree-shaped” structure allows engineers and managers to better plan how to c ry out sub-tasks
and elementary tasks, in order to properly satisfy the fulfilment of higher-level tasks, taking into
account the tasks sequence. As noted by Shepherd [42], although elementary tasks are not necessarily
complex in the s lves, the higher-level task is complex, since it consists of interrelated elementary
tasks. Analyzing where th frequency of events can affect human performance, potential errors can be
captured by HTA and classified, e.g., in inter-step (when the operator fails to execute an elementary
task or re-arrange its sequence) and intra-step (the failure of an operator to correctly execute an
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individual elementary task) errors [73]. To maximize the benefits of this technique, a set of generic
error modes is needed [74].
3.3. The Human Error Assessment and Reduction Technique
Associating error probabilities with generic tasks, the Human Error Assessment and Reduction
Technique (HEART) allows their quantitative evaluation against Error Producing Conditions
(EPCs) [43]. In more detail, nine types of generic tasks are identified and associated with nominal
human unreliability values P0 (Table 3).
Table 3. Values of the nominal human unreliability (P0) according to Embrey [75].
Generic Task/Activity P0
A Totally unfamiliar, performed at speed with no real idea of likely consequences 0.55
B Shift/restore system to new or original state on a single attempt without supervisor procedure 0.26
C Complex task requiring a high level of comprehension and skill 0.16
D Fairly simple task performed rapidly or given scant attention 0.09
E Routine, highly practiced, rapid task involving a relatively low level of skill 0.02
F Restore or shift system to original or new state following procedures with some checking 0.003
G
Completely familiar, highly practiced, routine task, highly trained and experienced person, totally
aware of implications of failure with time to correct the potential error but without the benefit of
significant job aids
0.0004
H Respond correctly to the system command even when there is an augmented or an automatedsupervisory system providing an accurate interpretation of the system state 0.000002
M Miscellaneous tasks/activities for which no description can be found 0.03
Accordingly, the method distinguishes a set of EPCs that affect task performances (Table 4) by
means of the following equations:
P = P0 ×∏
i
PFi (1)
PFi = [(EPCi − 1)×Api] + 1 (2)
where, P represents the human error probability index, P0 is the nominal human unreliability value
(from Table 3), and PFi represents the Performance Factor of the i-th activity. EPCi is the Error
Promoting Condition (derived from Table 4), while Api represents the proportion assessment factor,
i.e., the evaluation of the proportion of each EPCi that exists in the task being assessed. The latter
parameter ranges from 0 to 1, depending on the extent to which the effect of the EPCs deviate from
the ideal value of 1 [75]. For instance, if engineers evaluate that about 40 percent of the full effect of
inexperience is likely to be present (i.e., the operator is not completely inexperienced) a value of 0.4 in
the Equation (2) is assigned.
Table 4. Values of the Error-Promoting Conditions (EPCs) according to Embrey [75].
n. Error-Promoting Conditions (EPCs) Value
1 Unfamiliarity with novel or infrequent situation which is potentially important 17
2 Shortage of time for error detection or correction 11
3 Noisy/confused signals 10
4 A means of suppressing or overriding information 9
5 No means of conveying spatial or functional information to human operator 9
6 Poor system/human user interface 8
7 No obvious means of reversing an unintended action 8
8 Information overload 6
9 Technique unlearning/one which requires application of opposing philosophy 6
10 Transfer knowledge from one task to another 5
11 Ambiguity in required performance standard 5
12 Mismatch between perceived and actual risk 4
13 Poor, ambiguous or ill-matched feedback 4
14 No clear/direct/timely confirmation of intended action from system 4
15 Inexperience (newly qualified but not an expert) 3
16 Poor instructions or procedures 3
17 Little or no independent checking or testing of output 3
18 No diversity of information input for veracity checks 2.5
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3.4. The Proposed Methodology
Based on the above considerations, a risk assessment methodology was implemented, with the
goal of including human error considerations in the hazard analysis of agriculture working tasks
related to the use of machinery (Figure 5).
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Figure 5. Scheme of the proposed methodology.
The general framework of the proposed methodology is based on the use of the QFD method,
adapting the approach proposed by Bas [39] to a two-phase procedure, each of which is characterized
by the implementation of a HoQ aimed at the prioritization of hazards (HoQ1) and hazardous events
(HoQ2). In more detail, the methodology is articulated in the following steps:
1. Task analysis.
The specific activities related to a general task are considered: for instance, if the analysis concerns
the use of a tractor, all the work situations related to its use in a specific context should be considered,
including the setting operations and equipment connection (e.g., the presence on the tractor of an
atomizer or tillage tools).
For this purpose, the HTA method can be used, distinguishing among (Figure 6): general tasks
(e.g., use of a tractor in vineyard cultivation), sub-tasks (e.g., preparation of the equipment, mobility,
cultivation, and equipment maintenance and cleaning), elementary tasks (e.g., driving position access,
connection of working tools and implements, tillage, etc.), and specific activities (e.g., getting in/out
from the tractor’s cabin/seat, attaching milling, ripping implements, ripping, milling, spraying
fertilizers, etc.).
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Figure 6. Scheme of the Hierarchical Task Analysis (HTA) method.
2. Prioritization of the tasks.
The level f importance of ach elementary ta k/specific activity is evaluated by means of the
HEART method, based on the results of semi-structured questionnaires and interviews with operators.
. Definition of the hazards.
t l t t i t fi , t i i t t t l i t
i laws and standards, but also th results of the interviews with the operators
(e.g., experiences of near-misse ), as well as information provi ed by experts (e.g., guidelines a t
r ti ).
. Prioritization of the hazards.
t ll t i t i t i l t i t fi t , t t
r r s t the “Whats”, the haz rds are the “Hows”, while t e importance level of th tasks is inputted
considering their prioritization at the level of elementary tasks (step 2). It has to be noted that, in the
traditional HoQ, the score used in the relationship matrix is based on a 0-1-3-9 scale (0 = no relationship;
1 = weak relationship; 3 = medium relationship; 9 = strong relationship) [38], while different types of
scal s can be used dep ndi g on the context of the study [70]. In this study, to be coherent, we decided
t follow th assessment sc re proposed by Bas [39]: the r lationships between task and hazards
are ev luated by means of a 0-3-9 scale (0 = n relationship; 3 = medium relationship; 9 = strong
r l ti s i ). The output of this step is r presented by hazard prioritization.
. Definition of hazardous events.
I r r t fi t ssi l ts r l t t t r s i li t i t r i s st s,
t l sis f i ts r- iss s, s ll s t s sti s r i st r s
i li s, t c si r .
. Prioritization of the events.
s i r i s st s, t i l t ti f t s ll s i rs t l t t
r l ti s i s et een hazards (the “Whats”) and events (the “Hows”) by means of a 0-3-9 scale
(0 = no relationship; 3 = medium relationship; 9 = strong relationship). As far as the importance l vel
of t e h zards, th results provi ed by step 4 are used. The final o tput of this step is r pres nted
by the prioritization of the possible events that might lead to an accident during the use of a tractor,
taking into account the human error probability.
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4. Case Study
The validity of the proposed approach was tested in collaboration with two companies that
operate in vineyard cultivation: approximately 5 hectares for company A, and 3 hectares for company
B, in hilly areas (200 m a.m.s.l. (above mean sea level) and 350 m a.m.s.l. respectively). In more
detail, the focus group that was interviewed was composed of two managers (with more than 10 years’
experience in this sector) and 5 operators (3 for company A and 2 for company B, with more than 5 years’
experience with tractors). We selected these two companies for the following reasons. They represent a
typical example of companies operating in the Italian agricultural sector, which is mainly founded on
SMEs (Small and Medium-sized Enterprises) characterized by a very small number of employees [76].
Moreover, vineyard cultivation is very diffused in Italy; hence, these types of companies can be
considered as a representative sample of the national context. In addition, it is worth noting that
these two companies were also selected from among others, as they use similar types of machinery.
In fact, both companies use narrow-track tractors equipped with a front-mounted reclining ROPS
(Roll-Over Protective Structure), while the equipment attached to the tractors consisted of the following
machinery:
• Mulcher/shredder
• Rotary tiller
• Atomizer
• Trailer
It is worth noting that, in order to reduce a possible bias, the interviews with each member
of the above-mentioned focus group were carried out separately. Similarly, the responses to the
semi-structured questionnaires were kept anonymous.
4.1. Task Analysis
The analysis of tasks was carried out using the HTA method (Section 3.2). The results of this
analysis are summarized in Table 5.
Table 5. Hierarchical classification of working tasks and activities.
Sub-Tasks Elementary Tasks Specific Activities
1. Preparation
1.1. Access to the working position
1.1.1. Getting on
1.1.2. Starting
1.1.3. Getting out
1.2. Attachment of the equipment 1.2.1. Power Take Off (PTO) attachment
1.2.2. Three-point hitch attachment
1.3. Materials and tools loading
2. Transportation 2.1. Road transit
2.2. In field transit
3. Fieldworks
3.1. Equipment settings
3.2. Field works
3.2.1. Extra line works
3.2.2. Intra-lines works
3.3. Pesticides application
3.3.1. Pesticides handling
3.3.2. Pesticides mixing
3.3.3. Pesticides spraying
4. Maintenance
4.1. Equipment checking
4.2. Cleaning of the equipment
Agriculture 2018, 8, 82 11 of 21
4.2. Prioritization of Tasks
The assessment of the tasks was carried out by means of the HEART method, as explained in
Section 3.3. The first step consisted of an evaluation of the Performance Factors: i.e., considering the
activity 1.2.1., “Three-point hitch attachment”, the following types of possible EPCs were considered,
taking into account the responses provided by focus group members:
• Poor system/human user interface (EPC n. 6)
• Technique unlearning/one which requires the application of an opposing philosophy (EPC n. 9)
• Mismatch between perceived and actual risk (EPC n. 12)
• Inexperience (e.g., newly qualified but not an expert) (EPC n. 15)
An example of the evaluation is reported in Table 6.
Table 6. Performance factor assessment by means of the HEART method (excerpt).
Task/Activity EPCs Number PFi = {(EPCi − 1) ×Api + 1}
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1.2.1 Three-point hitch
attachment
6 ((8 − 1) × 0.5) + 1 = 4.5
78.75
9 ((6 − 1) × 0.5) + 1 = 3.5
12 ((4 − 1) × 0.5) + 1 = 2.5
15 ((3 − 1) × 0.5) + 1 = 2
1.2.2 PTO attachment
6 ((8 − 1) × 0.5) + 1 = 4.5
157.75
9 ((6 − 1) × 0.5) + 1 = 3.5
12 ((4 − 1) × 0.5) + 1 = 2.5
15 ((3 − 1) × 0.5) + 1 = 2
17 ((3 − 1) × 0.5) + 1 = 2
1.3.1 Materials and tools loading
10 ((5 − 1) × 0.5)+ 1 = 3
1215 ((3 − 1) × 0.5) + 1 = 2
16 ((3 − 1) × 0.5) + 1 = 2
2.1.1 Road transit
6 ((8 − 1) × 0.5) + 1 = 4.5
56.25
12 ((4 − 1) × 0.5) + 1 = 2.5
14 ((4 − 1) × 0.5) + 1 = 2.5
15 ((3 − 1) × 0.5) + 1 = 2
2.1.2 In field transit
5 ((9 − 1) × 0.5) + 1= 5
281.25
6 ((8 − 1) × 0.5) + 1 = 4.5
12 ((4 − 1) × 0.5) + 1 = 2.5
13 ((4 − 1) × 0.5) + 1 = 2.5
16 ((3 − 1) × 0.5) + 1 = 2
3.1. Equipment settings
6 ((8 − 1) × 0.5) + 1 = 4.5
78.75
9 ((6 − 1) × 0.5) + 1 = 3.5
12 ((4 − 1) × 0.5) + 1 = 2.5
15 ((3 − 1) × 0.5) + 1 = 2
3.2.1 Extra-lines works
6 ((8 − 1) × 0.5) + 1 = 4.5
56.25
12 ((4 − 1) × 0.5) + 1 = 2.5
13 ((4 − 1) × 0.5) + 1 = 2.5
16 ((3 − 1) × 0.5) + 1 = 2
3.2.2 Intra-lines works
6 ((8 − 1) × 0.5) + 1 = 4.5
11.2513 ((4 − 1) × 0.5) + 1 = 2.5
3.3.1 Pesticides handling
6 ((8 − 1) × 0.5) + 1 = 4.5
11.2512 ((4 − 1) × 0.5) + 1 = 2.5
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Note: Api = proportion assessment factor; EPCs = error producing conditions; EPCi = i-th error producing condition;
PFi = performance factor of the i-th activity.
Accordingly, the assessment of the human error probability index (P) is reported in Table 7.
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Table 7. Values of the human error probability index (P).
Tasks/Activities P0 Πi PFi P
1.1.1. Getting on board 0.02 45 0.900
1.1.2. Starting 0.02 11.25 0.225
1.1.3. Getting out 0.02 56.25 1.125
1.2.1. Three-point hitch attachment 0.016 78.75 1.260
1.2.2. PTO attachment 0.016 157.75 2.524
1.3. Materials and tools loading 0.003 12 0.036
2.1. Road transit 0.02 56.25 1.125
2.2. In field transit 0.02 281.25 5.625
3.1. Equipment settings 0.003 78.75 0.236
3.2.1. Intra-lines works 0.02 11.25 0.225
3.2.2. Extra line operations 0.02 135 2.700
3.3.1. Pesticides handling 0.003 56.25 0.169
3.3.2. Pesticides mixing 0.003 11.25 0.034
3.3.3. Pesticides spraying 0.02 112.5 2.250
4.1. Equipment checking 0.02 20 0.4
4.2. Cleaning of the equipment 0.02 20 0.4
Note: P0 = nominal human unreliability value; P = human error probability index; PFi = performance factor of the
i-th activity.
4.3. Definition of Hazards
The hazards related to the examined tasks were defined considering both data concerning accident
reports and the requirements of laws and regulations. The final result of this step is summarized in
Table 8.
Table 8. List of Hazards.
Hazard Code Type of Hazard
H1 Machinery mobility
H2 Moving elements
H3 High-temperature parts
H4 Stability (machinery)
H5 Environment (dust, heat, wind)
H6 Environment (gradient)
H7 Noise/Vibrations
H8 Ergonomic (posture, space limits, movements)
H9 Ergonomic (commands)
H10 Combination of hazards
H11 Manual handling
H12 Hazardous substances
4.4. Prioritization of Hazards
In this stage, the first HoQ is implemented, where the “Whats” are represented by the tasks
(Section 4.1) and the “Hows” by the hazards defined in the previous step. As far as the fulfilment
of the relationship matrix is concerned, the members of the focus group were asked to evaluate the
relationships using a 0-3-9 scale, as explained in Section 3.4. As for the importance level of tasks,
data obtained in Section 4.2 were considered, taking into account the human error probability of each
elementary task.
In detail, when the elementary task consists of several activities, the highest value of the human
error probability is considered. For example, for the elementary task 1.2., “Attachment of the
equipment”, the score related to the activity 1.2.2., “PTO attachment”, was considered. The obtained
results allowed us to evaluate the level of importance of the hazards relative to the tasks and the
human error probability associated with the latter (Figure 7).
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4.5. Definition of the Hazardous Events
The hazardous events and situations related ith both the tasks and hazards exa ined in the
previous steps ere defined considering safety la s and standards, data concerning accident reports,
and the interviews with the e bers of the focus group. Following a botto -up approach [77], the list
of the ain events that can lead to har is reported in Table 9.
Table 9. List of the hazardous events.
Event Code Event
E1 Contact with cutting/rotating parts
E2 Contact with high-temperature parts
E3 Loss of stability (roll-over)
E4 Contact with ejected objects
E5 Exposure to m sculoskeletal disorders
E6 Exposure to noise/vibrations
E7 Slipping, falling from the tractor
E8 Unintended movements (collision, impact with other vehicles)
E9 Crushing (running over/ knockdown of the operator or other people)
E10 Impacts with objects
E11 Intoxication
4.6. Prioritization of the Events
In this stage, the second HoQ was implemented, where the “Whats” are represented by the
hazards, and the “Hows” by the events defined in the previous steps. As far as the fulfilment of
the relationship matrix is concerned, the members of the focus group were asked to evaluate the
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relationships using a 0-3-9 scale, as explained in Section 3.4. The obtained results allowed us to
evaluate the level of importance of hazardous events (Figure 8).
Agriculture 2018, 8, x FOR PEER REVIEW  14 of 21 
 
4.6. Prioritization of the Events 
In this stage, the second HoQ was implemented, where the “Whats” are represented by the 
hazards, and the “Hows” by the events defined in the previous steps. As far as the fulfilment of the 
relationship matrix is concerned, the members of the focus group were asked to evaluate the 
relationships using a 0-3-9 scale, as explained in Section 3.4. The obtained results allowed us to 
evaluate the level of importance of hazardous events (Figure 8). 
 
Figure 8. HoQ2: assessment of the relationships between hazards and hazardous events. 
5. Discussion of Results 
The results obtained from the case study can be summarized in the following figures, where the 
overall priorities of hazard types (Figure 9) and events (Figure 10) are shown. 
As far as hazard types are concerned, the assessment shows that the stability of the machinery 
(i.e., the tractor and equipment) and its mobility represent the most relevant source of danger when 
operating in vineyards. Beside this output, which is in line with accident statistics, it is worth noting 
 
H
az
ar
ds
' i
m
po
rt
an
ce
 le
ve
l 
Events 
 
E
1 
- C
on
ta
ct
 w
ith
 c
ut
tin
g/
ro
ta
tin
g 
pa
rts
 
E
2 
- C
on
ta
ct
 w
ith
 h
ig
h 
te
m
pe
ra
tu
re
 
pa
rts
 
E
3 
-L
os
s 
of
 s
ta
bi
lit
y 
(ro
ll-
ov
er
) 
E
4 
- C
on
ta
ct
 w
ith
 e
je
ct
ed
 o
bj
ec
ts
 
E
5 
- E
xp
os
ur
e 
to
 m
us
cu
lo
sk
el
et
al
 
di
so
rd
er
s 
 
E
6 
- E
xp
os
ur
e 
to
 n
oi
se
/v
ib
ra
tio
ns
 
E
7 
- S
lip
pi
ng
. f
al
lin
g 
fro
m
 th
e 
tra
ct
or
 
E
8 
- U
ni
nt
en
de
d 
m
ov
em
en
ts
 (a
cc
id
en
t, 
im
pa
ct
 w
ith
 o
th
er
 e
qu
ip
m
en
t) 
E
9 
- C
ru
sh
in
g 
(k
no
ck
 d
ow
n)
 
E
10
 - 
Im
pa
ct
s 
w
ith
 o
bj
ec
ts
 
E
11
 - 
In
to
xi
ca
tio
n 
Hazards 
H1 - Machinery mobility 0.76     9.0   3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 9.0   
H2 - Moving elements 0.44 9.0 3.0   3.0       9.0       
H3 – High temperature parts 0.05   9.0                   
H4 - Stability (machinery) 1.00     9.0       9.0 3.0 3.0 3.0   
H5 - Environment (dust, heat, 
wind) 0.34     3.0   3.0             
H6 - Environment (gradient) 0.49     9.0   3.0     3.0 3.0     
H7 - Noise /Vibrations 0.27         3.0 9.0           
H8 - Ergonomic (posture, space 
limits, movements) 0.57 9.0 3.0   3.0 9.0 3.0 9.0   9.0 3.0 3.0 
H9 - Ergonomic (commands) 0.51 3.0   3.0   3.0   3.0   9.0 3.0   
H10 - Combination of hazards 0.33 9.0 3.0 3.0   3.0   9.0   9.0 3.0 3.0 
H11 - Manual handling 0.24         9.0         3.0 3.0 
H12 - Hazardous substances 0.24                     9.0 
Importance level of Events 13.59 4.51 23.75 3.02 15.35 6.36 20.91 10.70 19.40 14.76 5.63 
Relative Importance level of Events 
(normalized) 0.707 0.235 1.236 0.157 0.798 0.331 1.088 0.557 1.010 0.768 0.293 
Ranking 6 10 1 11 4 8 2 7 3 5 9 
Figure 8. HoQ2: assessment of the relationships between hazards and hazardous events.
5. Discussion of Results
The results obtained from the case study can be summarized in the following figures, where the
overall priorities of hazard types (Figure 9) and events (Figure 10) are shown.
As far as hazard types are concerned, the assessment shows that the stability of the machinery
(i.e., the tractor and equipment) and its mobility represent the most relevant source of danger when
operating in vineyards. Beside this output, which is in line with accident statistics, it is worth noting
that problems related to ergonomic issues are also quite significant when considering the effects of
human reliability. This agrees with research findings provided by Hagel et al. [78].
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In addition, some interesting findings can be observed when analyzing the level of importance of
hazardous events. In fact, the most relevant hazardous event is the loss of stability of the machinery
(which might lead to tractor rollover), which is mainly due to the fact that the operator often does not
correctly use the reclining ROPS. Hence, the analysis of the human error probability index stresses
the need for further research aimed at providing solutions to this type of hazardous situation, such as
the study of compact ROPS, or automated systems to activate it independently of the behavior of the
operator, corroborating the research clues provided by Mayrhofer et al. [25] and Colantoni et al. [54].
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The second most important type of event concerns the possibility of slipping and/or falling
from the tractor. This aspect is quite relevant, since it is related to a type of accident that is usually
underestimated when performing risk assessment activities, as well as in the official reports on
accidents. Slipping or falling from the tractor usually lead to scrapes, lacerations, or contusions, that in
most of cases have non-severe consequences for the operator. Consequently, this type of injury is rarely
reported, as it normally requires only a few days to recover from. Nevertheless, the occurrence of such
incidents is quite common, as was shown from the interviews; the operators frequently get on/out of
the tractor, even when it is running, during field work.
On the one hand, the relevance of this type of accident is in line with findings by other studies
of different sectors. For example, Shibuya et al. [79] pointed out that slips and trips represent a
contributing factor for occupational accidents among truck drivers. On the other hand, it is worth
noting that the peculiarities of agricultural activities make this type of human error more significant
than in other sectors. Hence, this type of accident needs to be better addressed when implementing
preventive and protective measures for tractor users. For example, to prevent this type of behavior,
specific training, as well as the use of pictorials and other means of communication should be provided.
While from the machinery safety point of view, proper handles, and the use of systems to detect
the presence of the driver on board, can also contribute to reducing the occurrence of these types
of problems. Therefore, the results of the present study could potentially serve to address company
managers, not only in properly improving operator training and information, but also in implementing
technical solutions which are able to reduce the risks related to incorrect behavior [80].
As far as the assessment of the human error probability is concerned, this study brought to light
the low perception and poor awareness of safety issues among the workers, especially when dealing
with tractors. This was consistent with the findings provided by [41,70]. This also reinforces the notion
that small companies are not interested in innovative and safer features on their machinery, as pointed
out by Cavallo et al. [81].
From a methodological viewpoint, the results achieved by the proposed procedure highlight the
benefits of the cause-effect assessment allowed by the HoQ. In fact, in this way it is possible to consider
the hazards related to the different activities of a generic working task, such as the use of a tractor, in a
more detailed and effective manner.
Moreover, the integration of human error analyses within such a bottom-up approach represents
a novelty in the sector of safety assessment for agricultural activities, providing a first valuable basis
for further analysis and implementation by researchers and practitioners.
Besides these positive aspects, some limitations of the present study need to be discussed. Firstly,
the focus group’s characteristics could be improved in order to augment the consistency of the study
outputs, e.g., increasing the number of both companies involved and the users interviewed. In addition,
focus group in-depth discussions could bring about a clearer exploration [82,83].
Secondly, to augment the quality of data provided by the proposed methodology, supporting
techniques, such as the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP), and the fuzzy could be used, especially
for elements concerning QFD logic [67,68,84,85]. Nevertheless, this might require additional
computational efforts, while the results of the proposed methodology should be used in qualitative
terms, i.e., as a guideline for choosing priority items [86].
Finally, it is worth noting that, due to the nature of the study, which is a case study research,
caution is required in generalizing the findings beyond the sample and industry concerned [87];
that said, the use of a case-study as a research tool for exploratory investigations, and to generate new
understandings, has been recognized by several authors (e.g., in [88,89]). Moreover, the implementation
of the proposed approach through the use of hands-on software can extend its usability to
inexperienced audiences [90–92].
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6. Conclusions
This study proposes a novel approach to carrying out hazard analysis, taking into account the
impact of human reliability during agricultural work. The improvement of safety conditions should
not rely on compliance with normative requirements only, but should also consider how farmers
usually behave [33,93]. In order to verify the feasibility of such an approach, it was applied to a case
study of the use of narrow-track tractors in vineyards. Practical results highlighted the relevance of
ergonomic issues when assessing the hazardous situations related to the specific activities performed
by the operators, and stressed their incorrect behavior when dealing with work equipment.
The present research work is an exploratory study aimed at making a first attempt to address the
analysis of hazards in agricultural activities from a human-centered perspective. As such, although the
achieved results corroborate existing studies on health and safety in agriculture, their generalization
needs to be augmented by further studies.
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